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PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL FEES EMERGE FROM
THE WILDERNESS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968 oil reserves were discovered on the North Slope of Alaska.
Although extensive plans were made by a consortium of major oil companies
to transport the oil by pipeline to a port on the ice-free Pacific shore,
environmental groups brought suit to enjoin' the construction of the pipeline
on the grounds that the right-of-way approved by the Secretary of the Interior
was granted in violation of the width restrictions of section 28 of the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920,2 and that the environmental impact statement
required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)3 was
inadequate. Although the district court refused to grant a permanent injunc-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed on a literal reading of section 28. 4 Thereafter, Congress passed
legislation s which effectively set aside the decision of the court and the case
was dismissed. Subsequently plaintiffs, a foundation funded public interest
law firm, moved for and obtained an award of attorney fees. 6
II. THE RESTRICTIVE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The courts have granted attorney's fees on the basis of three exceptions to
the general American rule which denies to the successful litigant attorney fees
" 'in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor.' "7 A
departure from English common law, which has for centuries granted such
fees to the prevailing party,8 the rule has been criticized for denying the
successful claimant full compensation for damage since his "recovery would
1. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
2. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 449; Act of Aug. 21, 1935, ch. 599, § 1, 49 Stat.
678; Act of Aug. 12, 1953, ch. 408, 67 Stat. 557, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). For
subsequent amendments, see note 5 infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
4. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973). Title of the case changed on appeal as a result of the resignation of Secretary Hickel and
the appointment of a new Secretary of the Interior.
5. Mineral Lands Leasing Act § 28, 30 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1973); Trans-Alaskan Pipeline
Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651 et seq. (1973).
6. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, sub nom.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 43 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No.
73-1977) [hereinafter cited as Alyeskal. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company eventually was forced
to pay one half of plaintiff's attorney fees. Id. at 1036.
7. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1974),
quoting, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
8. Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849, 851-53 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Costs]; Stoebuck,
Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202, 204-07 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Stoebuck]. The historical genesis for this American revision can be traced to
the early settlers' suspicion of the lawyer, and their concept of the law as an easily understandable
body of rules. See, e.g., Costs 873; McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New
Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 780 (1972).
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always be diminished by the cost of his legal representation."9 Nevertheless
the American rule maintains its good standing in the federal courts.
The rationale used by the courts in upholding this rule is four-fold. First, it
has been reasoned that it is unfair to penalize a party which has elected to
prosecute or defend a suit in good faith.10 In addition, the granting of such
costs may deter those plaintiffs who are fearful of incurring additional costs,
should they be unsuccessful."' Furthermore, the additional court time and
expense involved in determiniing such fees "would pose substantial burdens
for judicial administration.' 2 Finally, there has been a concern that court
ordered fees may threaten "the principle of independent advocacy,"' 3 as
lawyers might improperly defend their clients while attempting to appease the
judge.
The American rule, however, has never been a complete bar to an award of
fees. Over the years several major exceptions to the rule have developed from
"the inherent power of a court"' 4 to do " 'equity in a particular situation.' "Is
The oldest of these exceptions is the bad faith doctrine, under which a court
may award fees to either party as a means of punishing abuse of the judicial
process. For example, courts have awarded fees to a plaintiff who was forced
to secure compliance with a prior judgment by initiating civil contempt
proceedings. 16 Moreover, where either party has acted " 'vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons,' "117 the courts have awarded fees as an additional
fine on the defiant party.' s The courts generaly have refrained from using the
9. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1974).
See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev.
75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931); Stoebuck 202; Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees
and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Access
to the Courts]; Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev.
1216 (1967).
10. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
11. Id.; cf. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964).
12. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); F.D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. CL 2157, 2165 (1974).
13. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. Ct. 2157, 2165
(1974).
14. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D.
Del. 1974).
15. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
166 (1939).
16. See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); First Nat'l
Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973). But see, Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d
682 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974).
17. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), quoting 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 54.77121, at
1709 (2d ed. 1972).
18. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Stolberg v. Board of
Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1973); McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir.
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bad faith exception because of its punitive nature.' 9 Recently, however, they
have demonstrated a greater willingness, especially in racial discrimination
cases, 20 to expand the scope of this exception based on the need for "judicial
prodding" 2t of reluctant defendants. 2 2
The second major exception to the American rule, the common fund
doctrine, is based on the unfairness of burdening the individual litigant with
the entire cost of the action when his initiative has either created or preserved
a fund for the benefit of others as well as himself. 23 As a means of avoiding
such unjust enrichment, the courts have implied an agency relationship
between the plaintiff and the beneficiaries in order to spread the costs of the
action, including legal fees, proportionately among all who benefit. 24 The
common fund doctrine has received broader application in recent years as
courts have allowed fees to plaintiffs even though no actual fund was
recovered but the judgment or settlement "has conferred a substantial benefit
on a class of persons and the court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost
proportionately among the members of the benefitted class. ' ' 2 5 For instance, in
1963). See generally Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 I-larv. L. Rev. 411,
418-19 (1973).
19. See Equal Access to the Courts 645-46.
20. See, e.g., Note, Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in School Desegregation Cases: Demise of
the Bad-Faith Standard, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 371 (1972); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in
Civil Rights Actions, 7 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 381 (1971); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees In
Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action Is Not Based on a Statute Providing For an Award of
Attorney Fees, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 405 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Fees in Civil Rights
Litigation]. See generally Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
411 (1973).
21. Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12, 14 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Attorney Fees in
Civil Rights Litigation.
23. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970)
(stock transaction). See Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974) (antitrust class
action). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1597 (1974).
24. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1882) (action to enjoin fraudulent sale of
trust assets). See also Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451, 461 (1932) (preservation of trust fund);
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29, 32-34 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (consumer class action);
McCormick, Damages § 157, 623-24 (1935); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private
Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 Hastings
L.J. 733, 736 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Green Light].
25. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. Ct. 2157, 2165
(1974). The necessity for actually recovering a fund was obviated only recently in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), where Justice Harlan adopted the rationale of Bosch v.
Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960) in defining
"substantial benefit" as "something more than technical in its consequence ... that accomplishes
a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and Interests
of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's
interest." 396 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). See also Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees
After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Allocation of Attorney's Fees]; Note, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to
ATTORNEY FEES
Hall v. Cole, 26 a union free speech case, the Court awarded fees, stating.
[B]y vindicating his own right, the successful litigant dispels the 'chill' cast upon the
rights of others .... Thus ... reimbursement of respondent's attorneys' fees out of the
union treasury simply shifts the costs of litigation to 'the class that has benefited from
them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.'"
Despite the broad language in Hall, the use of this exception is restricted by
the necessity of having both an ascertainable class of beneficiaries and a joint
resource common to the class from which the court may make an award. Its
application, however, to areas such as civil rights and environmental protec-
tion would seem to be of doubtful validity. Nevertheless, several courts28 and
commentators 29 have suggested that awards in these areas may be based on a
common fund rationale. It is conceptually inconsistent, however, to apply an
exception based on "the fair matching of the costs and benefits of the
litigation"30 to situations where society in general has benefitted. The benefit,
in this instance, to any individual would be minute and it would be extremely
difficult to distribute or tax a pro rata share.33
III. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION
Two Supreme Court decisions have proven to be seminal in the develop-
ment of a new, private attorney general exception to the restrictive American
rule. 32 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 33 plaintiffs successfully
brought a class action to enjoin racial discrimination under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.34 Under this statute a court, "in its discretion," may
Award Fees From Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 271 [hereinafter cited as Third
Party Beneficiaries].
26. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
27. Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Yablonski v. UMW, 466 F.2d 424, 431 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348. 354-55 (3d Cir. 19671,
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968).
28. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Ist Cir. 1973)
(environment); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972) (school busing-quasi-application of the common fund doctrine).
29. See, e.g., Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litiga-
tion, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1236-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Awarding Attorney Fees in
Environmental Litigation]; Allocation of Attorney's Fees 328-31; Third Party Beneficiaries 284.
30. Equal Access to the Courts 673.
31. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952-54 (4th Cir.) (AVinter, J., concuring), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
32. The rapid growth of the exception has led at least one court to state that it may
'emasculate the general rule against fee awards and inject more unpredictability into the judicial
process.' " Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 330 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 94 &
Ct. 2006 (1974), quoting 50 Texas L. Rev. 204, 209 (1971). The Supreme Court has twice
declined to rule specifically on the validity of this exception. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex
rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 94 S. Ct. 2157, 2165 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.7 (1973).
33. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam); accord, Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S.
427 (1973) (per curiam).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a)-6(b) (1970).
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award a "reasonable attorney's fee" to the prevailing party. 3" In rejecting a
narrow interpretation of the statute as permitting the award of fees only on a
showing of bad faith, the Supreme Court emphasized that Title II suits were
"private in form only" 36 and concluded:
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he
obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney
general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the
injunctive powers of the federal courts. 37
Two years later, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 the Supreme Court
affirmed and expanded the rationale of Piggie Park. In Mills, minority
shareholders successfully sued the corporation for a violation of the proxy
regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.39 The Court initially
determined that no actual fund need be recovered in order to grant fees under
a common fund rationale.4 0 Then, however, it awarded fees on a "hybrid"
doctrine based on both the Piggie Park decision and the reasoning of the
common fund doctrine, stating:
[R]egardless of the relief granted, private stockholders' actions of this sort 'involve
corporate therapeutics', and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an
important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. To award attorneys' fees in such
a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle
the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose them on the class that has
benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit. 41
The rationale behind such an award of fees to a stockholder-protecting other
stockholders-and thereby upholding the federal securities laws can easily be
analogized to the citizen plaintiff who, in bringing actions which enhance
strong congressional and social policies confers substantial benefits on other
citizens.
Following Piggie Park, the lower federal courts limited the use of the public
interest exception to cases where there was a public interest clearly defined by
Congress.4 2 In the last two years, however, the courts have begun to award
fees in cases where no clear statutory authority existed. 43 Some of these courts
have employed their traditional equity power to grant appropriate relief if
35. Id. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
36. 390 U.S. at 401.
37. Id. at 402 (footnote omitted).
38. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
40. 396 U.S. at 392-93.
41. Id. at 396-97 (footnotes omitted).
42. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1971)
(housing); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970)
(employment); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 301,
321-31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum]; Judicial Green Light 742-48.
43. See note 47 infra.
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" 'overriding considerations' " indicated the need for such a recovery.4 4 As a
result, although no hard and fast rule has been established, several court
decisions have indicated:
[Wlhenever there is nothing in the statutory scheme which might be interpreted as
precluding it, a 'private attorney-general' should be awarded attorneys' fees when he
has [1] effectuated a strong Congressional policy [2] which has benefitted a large class
of people, and [3] where further the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement are such as to make the award essential.
4S
This rationale has been increasingly relied upon in granting attorney's fees to
plaintiffs in a wide range of public interest lawsuits.
46
IV. Wilderness Society v. Morton-WEIGHING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In Alyeska, the court was confronted with the propriety of assessing
attorney's fees against defendant pipeline company. Unlike prior decisions
which have adopted a more structured approach to determine whether such
an award should be granted, 4 7 Judge Wright, defining a private attorney
general as one who vindicates " 'a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority,' ",48 stressed the "broad equitable power" of the federal courts
to shift fees when the interests of justice so require. 4 9 He then concluded that
44. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (environment),
quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
45. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.RtD. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (footnote omitted)
(environment); accord, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (unconstitu-
tional search).
46. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (environment);
Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955-56 (D. Hawaii 1972) (unconstitutional restriction of political
campaign signs); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 286 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (inadequate
medical treatment of prisoners); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409-11 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(improper treatment of mental health); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd
mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1973) (reapportionment).
47. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). It is interesting to note that
many of the earlier cases which extended the private att6rney general exception were written by
two judges, Chief Judge Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama and Judge Peckam of the
Northern District of California. In Chief Judge Johnson's earlier opinions there was a marked
three-step rationale. See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. at 709-10; Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.,
691, 694-95 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1973). In his later opinions, however, a
much broader approach is evident. See Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612, 621 (M.D. Ala.
1974). Judge Peckam, who first applied the private attorney general exception to award fees in
the environmental area, was impressed by Chief Judge Johnson's earlier opinions. See his opinion
in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. at 98. Nevertheless he emphasized the "discretion" of the
court and the possibility that other factors could trigger such an award. Id. at 99. See Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Other courts have followed a more flexible
approach. Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974) (welfare); Sierra Club
v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
48. 495 F.2d at 1029, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968).
49. 495 F.2d at 1029-30.
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the equities of the case-substantial public interest5" and the deterrent effect
of not awarding fees on this as well as other public interest
litigation 5-'-weighed heavily in favor of granting an award. Unlike prior
courts which had failed to discuss the issue, Judge Wright emphasized that
the fear of inhibiting good faith litigation because of the increased cost is
"remote if not nonexistent" in cases such as Alyeska, "[w]here the interest at
stake is many times greater than the expected cost of one's opponent's
attorney's fees." 5 2
A. The Public Interest Factor
In reaching its decision the court in Alyeska felt that the litigation involved
public interest on several levels. First, in terms of constitutional law, the suit
involved a question of the integrity of the federal system i.e., the primary
responsibility of the Congress to regulate the use of public lands and the duty
of the executive to observe the restrictions imposed by the legislative
branch. 5 3 Secondly, the case had served as a "catalyst" in bringing about a
legislative policy consistent with the current national "commitment to improv-
ing and protecting our natural environment. '5 4 Furthermore, the suit focused
the attention of the public and Congress "on the major issue raised-the
relative merits of a trans-Canadian versus a trans-Alaskan route."5 5 This had
the practical effect of guaranteeing a "thorough and complete 's 6 environmen-
tal impact statement as required by the NEPA and the "therapeutic" effect of
amending an outdated statute thereby establishing greater environmental
safeguards on the construction and operation of the pipeline. S7
Although in Alyeska substantial benefit accrued to the general public by the
protection of the environment and the proper functioning of the
government,58 a question that the Alyeska court did not answer was:
[W]hich public policy warrants the encouragement of award of fees to attorneys for
private litigants who voluntarily take upon themselves the character of private
attorneys-general.5 9
Although it can be argued that almost every lawsuit advances both an
individual goal and furthers public interest in clarifying and maintaining the
rule of law, 60 several characteristics can be suggested as basic criteria to
50. Id. at 1032-36.
51. Id. at 1030-31.
52. Id. at 1032.
53. Id. at 1032-33.
54. Id. at 1034.
55. Id. at 1035 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 1032-35 & n.6.
57. Id. at 1033-34.
58. Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396
(1970). See also Third Party Beneficiaries 284.
59. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 94 S.
Ct. 2006 (1974).
60. See generally Nussbaum 304; Hearings on Legal Fees Before the Subcomm. on Represen-
tation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 798 (Oct. 4,
1973) (Statement of J. Kline, Esq., of Public Advocates, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Hearingsl.
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determine whether a lawsuit should be classified as in the public interest and,
therefore, eligible under the private attorney general theory for the awarding
of fees. A primary consideration is whether the issues which are the basis for
the suit are of substantial importance. 6 1 In Alyeska, the underlying issue was
the protection of the Alaskan environment. In this area, 62 as in that of racial
discrimination, 63 there has been a great deal of legislation and litigation. Both
areas, currently considered by the Congress and the courts to be of great
importance, would thus fit within the category of "public interest."
With the expansion of public interest litigation, however, the lower federal
courts have not limited the award of fees to instances where the legislative
branch has clearly defined a substantial public interest. Taking the initiative,
the courts have awarded fees in welfare cases, 64 and other areas involving
constitutionally protected activities. 65 The awarding of attorney's fees in these
cases can be justified by the inherent importance of these issues. For instance,
deprivation of welfare assistance threatens the indigent's existence, 66 and
61. See Nussbaum 304-05.
62. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II,
1972); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. II, 1972); Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. II, 1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S
727 (1972) (standing in environmental litigation); Scientists' Institute v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (suit under NEPA demanding a detailed impact statement for deployment of
nuclear reactors); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (action
under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act challenging failure to suspend registra-
tion of economic poisons); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) (challenge of FPC license for power plant).
63. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (1970) (public facilities); id. §
2000(e) (1970) (employment); The Civil Rights Act of 1968, id. §§ 3601-19 (1970) (fair housing);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (right to jury trial under fair housing statute); Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (community interest in maintaining balanced
racial atmosphere gives whites standing to sue); Swann v. Charlotte-lMIecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirmative measures required to integrate school system).
64. In Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974), an indigent plaintiff was
awarded fees following the entry of a consent judgment in which Hawaii's one-year residential
requirement for receipt of welfare benefits was waived. Cf. Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (attorney fees granted to plaintiff under common fund rationale).
65. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955
(1973) (infringement on free speech); Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (uncon-
stitutional tribunal to try traffic violations); Council of Orgs. on Police Accountability &
Responsibility v. Tate, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (revising civilian complaint procedures
concerning unconstitutional police procedures); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (unconstitutional search of college newspaper office); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949
(D. Hawaii 1972) (free speech-selective prohibition of political signs). But see Baltic Indep.
School Dist. v. South Dakota High School Activities Ass'n, 362 F. Supp. 780, 786 (D.S.D. 1973)
(despite holding of denial of equal protection, attorney fees were not awarded because no
coherent class was benefitted).
66. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court
noted: "The plaintiff benefited a significant class, persons who are both potential welfare
recipients and interstate travelers, by vindicating the federally protected right of interstate travel
free from the forfeiture of welfare benefits." Id. at 888-89.
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constitutional litigation suits vindicate basic freedoms.
Alyeska involved two important competing public interests, the protection
of the environment and the development of a domestic oil supply. In granting
fees to the plaintiff environmental groups, the court put into issue the
legitimacy of the judiciary choosing which public policy warrants the encour-
agement of such fees. As Judge Wilkey said in his dissent:
It is hard to visualize the average American in this winter of 1973-74, turning down
his thermostat and with a careful eye on his auto fuel gauge, feeling that warm glow of
gratitude to those public-spirited plaintiffs in the Alaska Pipeline case.
By delaying the obtaining of oil from the North Slope of Alaska for several
years, the plaintiffs conferred no public benefit on the United States of America. 6
Admittedly, it can be argued that the legislative branch, not the judiciary,
is the proper forum for resolution of important public issues because of the
range of effects and solutions. 68 Nevertheless, as in Alyeska, once a court has
taken jurisdiction of such a dispute, the necessity of a careful judicial
consideration of the public issues raised warrants the granting of fees to
plaintiff's attorneys.
B. The Potential Impact Factor
A second criterion for the courts to apply in determining when to grant fees
is what the impact of the award will have not only on the individual plaintiff
but also on others. In this category a class action suit would not be essential.
It might be an individual suit whose stare decisis effect would benefit a wide
group. For example, a plaintiff who brings an action based on a violation of
his civil rights vindicates not only his own rights but also the rights of others
who are similarly situated. 69 In addition, the deterrent effect of an award of
fees would serve to inhibit further discrimination. Although such an effect
was not achieved in Alyeska due to direct intervention 70 by Congress, in other
areas involving the enforcement of vital public interests such as the environ-
ment, consumer affairs, civil rights, constitutional issues, and protection of
the indigent citizen's rights, an award of fees would not only benefit a
substantial number of people but would act to deter future violations.
It appears arguable that, under the potential impact rubric, the plaintiff
need not prevail in the suit in order to be awarded attorneys fees.
67. 495 F.2d at 1042 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
68. See Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2
Ecology L.Q. 407, 412 (1972). But see the numerous recent statutes in which Congress has
authorized an award of attorney fees to successful plaintiffs in environmental actions: Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 11, 1972);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4)
(Supp. II, 1972); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
69. See Nussbaum 304-05.
70. See note 5 supra. For a full discussion of the chronology of this case, see Dominick &
Brody, The Alaska Pipeline; Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, 23 Am. U.L. Rev. 337 (1973).
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This Court is firmly convinced that even though the plaintiffs may have, at this stage,
technically lost this lawsuit, nevertheless, a very important service has been performed
in creating a greater public awareness of the dangers of pollution threatening this very
valuable natural resource .... 71
C. The Representation Factor
Another rationale for awarding fees exists in the fact that procedurally,
"justice demands" 72 equal representation of issues before the court. As Justice
Brennan stated in NAACP v. Button, 7 3 "[litigation] is . . . a form of political
expression. . . . [U]nder the conditions of modem government, litigation may
well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress
of grievances."
7 4
Another ground for granting fees relied upon by the court in Alyeska was
the economic deterrent and consequent potential impact that not granting an
award would have had on this and other citizen suits. 75 It has been acknow-
ledged widely that these suits are important because they provide the courts
with the opportunity to consider the "public interest" factor in its decision.7 6
In addition, private attorney general actions " 'guard the guardians' "77 in
that they "[police] those charged with implementing and following Congres-
sional mandates."78 Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the limited resources and
potentially conflicting interests within and among governmental entities" 79
71. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Tex. 1973); cf. Parham v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 430 (8th Cir. 1970). See also McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d
1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972), where losing plaintiff was awarded fees on
another ground.
72. Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 42 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1972), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2006 (1974).
73. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
74. Id. at 429-30; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring): "The
judiciary is an indispensible part of the operation of our federal system. With the growing
complexities of government it is often the one and only place where effective relief can be
obtained." Id. at 111. See Equal Access to the Courts 677.
75. 495 F.2d at 1030-31; cf. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
76. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973);
Office of Communications v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100-01
(N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Awarding Attorney Fees in Environmental Litigation.
77. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
78. Id.; see Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F.Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Pyramid Lake
Tribe v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669, 670 (D.D.C. 1973); Terris, The Hard Years Ahead for Public
Interest Law, Juris Doctor 22, 23 (July-Aug. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Hard Years for Public
Interest Law]; cf. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d at 1032-33.
79. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Concerning the lack of
natural resources, a recent article noted. "The [Council on Environmental Quality], which can
only spot check the majority of environmental impact statements since it has a staff of less than
twenty to review hundreds of statements each year, publishes the 102 MONITOR on its own
initiative as a pragmatic attempt to enlist public involvement in federal environmental reviews.
1974]
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Congress has authorized citizen suits as another method of enforcing public
policy in certain areas such as civil rights"° and the environment.8 '
Although all three facets were present in Alyeska, the problem still remains
that without the court's grant of fees, or alternatively, without foundation
funding, it is questionable whether this suit would ever have been brought.8 2
Justice Wright recognized the inequity of this situation when he stated:
Substantial benefits to the general public should not depend upon the financial status
of the individual volunteering to serve as plaintiff or upon the charity of public-
minded lawyers.8 3
D. The Policy Considerations
Attorneys who represented the environmental plaintiffs in the Alyeska case
faced many of the obstacles that have discouraged other attorneys from
participating in similar litigation.8 4 Not only are legal proceedings expensive
but these costs are increased in public interest suits due to the complexity of
the issues.85 In public interest litigation plaintiffs generally seek injunctive
relief rather than an award of damages. Consequently, the cost of litigation
cannot be offset by any possible recovery.8 6 Furthermore, because of the
The practice is a dramatic indication that even well-intentioned government agencies lack
adequate resources and sanctions to do their job, requiring the support of citizen plaintiffs as in
the present situation and more. In other situations, official inadequacy in enforcing environmen-
tal mandates can only be explained in more disingenuous terms: the agency is not energetic in
prosecuting violations or fails to act altogether because of political pressure, alignment with the
special interests it was intended to regulate, or because the agency is itself promoting the activity
that threatens the environment." King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest
Environmental Litigation, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 27, 70 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as
King & Plater]; cf. J. Goulden, The Superlawyers 39-42, 146, 150-224 (1971).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
81. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d) (Supp. II, 1972); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105(g)(4),
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. II, 1972); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. §
1857(h)-2(a) (1970).
82. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
83. 495 F.2d at 1030.
84. See generally Hearings 831-43 (testimony and statement of Dennis Flannery, Esq., of
Washington, D.C., who represented plaintiffs in the Alyeska case).
85. See, e.g., 495 F.2d at 1032; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d
1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See
generally Hearings 799 (statement of J. Anthony Kline, Esq.).
86. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968); Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94,
101 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
942 (1972). See also Miller, Enforcing the Coastal Act-Citizens' Suits and Attorneys' Fees, 49
Calif. St. B.J. 236, 241 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Miller]; Nussbaum 305-06. A recent
commentator has suggested two reasons for seeking this type of specific relief: "First, individual
damages are difficult to measure and apportion in a large-scale pollution action brought on behalf
of the public. Second, federal class actions for damages present jurisdictional problems which can
be obviated only if the numerous class members jointly seek specific relief for their common
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nature of public interest actions, defendants are generally governmental
bodies or large corporate entities both of whom often have unlimited legal
resources.
87
In addition, two substantial segments of the bar have been effectively
precluded from participating in large-scale public interest litigation. It is not
economically feasible for the attorney in private practice to expend the time
required to litigate public interest suits pro bono.8 8 Such activities, as was
demonstrated by the southern civil rights cases of the 1960s, also can lead to
criticism and a resultant loss of income.8 9 Similarly, attorneys in legal aid
programs have been restricted in this area by political pressure, 90 which has
limited their participation in public interest litigation to constitutional issues
raised in the context of their traditional role of initiating and defending suits
on behalf of the indigent client. 9'
When confronted with an environmental case such as Alveska, "[tihe only
realistic source of legal representation for citizen groups contemplating major
litigation is the foundation-funded public interest law firm."9 2 It appears
unlikely that foundations will be able to continue this funding indefinitely.
93
In addition, the small number of firms, their lack of resources and the sheer
size of such actions militate against their participating in more than a minimal
grievance." Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation 1226
(footnotes omitted).
87. See generally Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest
in Public Interest Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1006-07 (1970); Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections
on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59
Geo. L.J. 1095, 1095-97 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Halpern & Cunningham]; Hard Years for
Public Interest Law 23.
88. See Hearings 855: "Pro bono cases are frequently very complex, requiring massive
amounts of research and fact-gathering time. The private lawyer can rarely afford to devote
much time to nonpaying work when to do so would limit his ability to handle paying cases. The
lawyer must not only limit the number of nonpaying cases he can accept, but also must limit the
time he can spend on those he does accept." Id. (statement of Armand Derfner, Lawyers Comm.
for Civ. Rights Under Law).
89. Id. Despite Chief Judge Johnson's admonition to the private bar in Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ("It is the duty of members of the legal profession to
represent clients who are unable to pay for counsel and also to bring suits in the public interest"),
he recognized the economic and social pressures on the private lawyer in NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); see generally Comment,
Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees Awards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62
Geo. L.J. 1439, 1454 (1974); Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1974, at 28, col. 1.
90. See, e.g., Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J 930
(1972); Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 424 (1973).
See generally Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 25-26
(1971); Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 9, at 683.
91. See, e.g., Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972) (selective prohibition against
political signs held unconstitutional).
92. Hearings 842 (statement of D. Flannery, Esq.); see La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.RtD.
94, 101 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see generally King & Plater 71-76; Miller 241.
93. Halpern & Cunningham 1112; Hard Years for Public Interest Law 29.
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number of suits, and many worthy actions are never brought. 94 Furthermore,
because of a lack of resources the public interest lawyer may not be able to
raise plausible issues in cases because they are too technical and would be too
costly to litigate. 95
The awarding of fees appears to be the only practical way to encourage the
bringing of such meritorious actions. Two objections to such awards have
been raised: first, it is inequitable to grant attorney's fees only to plaintiffs;96
second, the courts fear an inundation of meritless actions. 97 As to the first,
limiting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing 98 plaintiffs unquestionably will
encourage public interest suits. As Judge Wright pointed out in Alyeska, if the
defendant recovered fees as the prevailing party, "the possibility of deterrence
would be significant and the rationale of the American rule would therefore
bar recovery of fees." 9 9
As to the second objection, the courts have never been powerless in the face
of meritless actions. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 100 the First Circuit noted that frivolous litigation
could be discouraged by awarding "costs of litigation to defendants where the
litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing."10 1 In these circumstances the
court also has the option of applying the bad faith exception. Finally, the
federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, may exercise their traditional
discretion to reject cases on procedural grounds, such as lack of standing'0 2 or
the requirement that plaintiff prove that a private rather than a public cause
of action is allowed. 10 3
94. Hearings 842 (statement of D. Flannery, Esq.). See also Equal Access to the Courts
674-80. Foundation-funded public interest law firms, therefore, are forced to look to cases with
wide public appeal in order not only to litigate on the merits but also to educate the public on the
issue presented. Interview with Angus Macbeth, Staff Attorney with the National Resources
Defense Council of New York, in New York City, Aug. 15, 1974. See also Halpern &
Cunni*nghan 1106, 1111.
95. Hearings 833-34 (statement of D. Flannery, Esq.).
96. See generally Miller 239.
97. Cf. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 94
S. Ct. 2006 (1974). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); King & Plater 81-85.
98. In Alyeska, although the court did not explicitly include success as a precondition for
recovery of attorney fees, it implied such a condition by denying fees to one plaintiff because they
had achieved no success. 495 F.2d at 1028. Such a conclusion appears incorrect, however, since
the court should stress the merits of the issues before it and the effectuation of social or
congressional policy. See King & Plater 78-81.
99. 495 F.2d at 1032 n.2.
100. 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 1338. See generally Miller 342-43.
102. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see, e.g., Cartwright, Handling of Air and
Water Pollution Cases by the Plaintiff, 9 Forum 639, 640-41 (1974); Comment, Standing in
Environmental Litigation: Let's Get to Merits, 10 Calif. W.L. Rev. 182 (1973).
103. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private right of action permitted
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) with Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp. 327 F.
Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (private right of action not allowed
under Federal Trade Commission Act).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the past two decades there has been a proliferation of public interest
litigation as newly formulated rights, new remedies and the exercise of official
discretion have been tested in the courts.' 0 4 With the realization that the
American rule, which denies fees to successful litigants, has acted as an
economic bar to these challenges, some courts have expanded the traditional
exceptions to the rule, and granted fees to public interest litigants. Still other
courts have granted fees under the newly-formed private attorney general
concept.
The rationale underlying the private attorney general concept is amor-
phous. For example, three circuit courts recently have stressed different
factors in awarding fees. 1s At the same time a recent "backtracking" among
the courts as to the use of this exception has left questions regarding its
continuing validity. 10 6 It would seem, therefore, that because "developments
are proceeding very rapidly in this area,' 0 7 some guidance is necessary. The
Supreme Court, however, has taken no position on the private attorney
general exception and has strongly suggested that, when faced with the
question of awarding fees, it is willing to leave this responsibility to
Congress.
The perspectives of the profession, the consumers of legal services and other interested
groups should be weighed in any decision to substantially undercut the application of
the American Rule in such litigation. Congress is aware of the issue. Thus whatever
the merit of arguments for a further departure from the American Rule ...those
arguments are properly addressed to Congress.' 8
Perhaps such a suggestion is not unwise. Although the awarding of fees at
the judge's discretion provides a means by which private citizens can over-
come the financial obstacles inherent in actions designed to protect broad
104. Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1008-16 (1970).
105. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) cert granted sub nom.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 43 U.S.-.W. 3185 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No.
73-1977) (balance of equities in favor of an award to plaintiff); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) ("an award of attorneys' fees should be made to a litigant who (1)
furthers the interests of a significant class of persons by (2) effectuating a strong congressional
policy.") Id. at 888; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir.
1973) ("[wlhen private litigation vindicates a significant public policy and, at the same time,
creates a widespread benefit, policy today favors awarding attorneys' fees against a party who
exists to serve or represent the interests of all those benefitted."). Id. at 1333. In addition, the
Second Circuit has awarded fees in environmental litigation without opinion. Hudson River
Fisherman's Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, Nos. 73-2258, 73-2259 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 1974). But
see Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 94 S. CL 2006
(1974).
106. M. Derfner, Attorneys' Fees in Pro Bono Public Cases 11-12 (1974). This is consistent
with the recent trends toward limiting class action suits in general. See Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
107. Miller 237.




public interests, it would also jeopardize the neutrality of the judicial branch
by involving the judge in subjective choices as to which public interest should
be subsidized by such an award. In addition, public interest litigation
encompasses a much wider scope of issues than the ones before the court, and
the necessity of broad social remedies involving large allocations of resources
are generally beyond the power of the court to enforce. It is time that
legislation be passed, either to abolish the restrictive American rule, or to
define in what situations and against what defendants' 0 9 fees should be
granted. Pending such action, one can expect a rather uneven approach to the
question of when such fees should be granted. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the restrictive American rule is no longer being applied to claims for private
attorney general fees, and that such fees in fact have emerged from the
wilderness.
Timothy R. Graham
109. Under common law, a private individual cannot sue the state as sovereign in its own
courts unless the state waives its inherent immunity. As for the sovereignty of the individual
states, whether fees will be allowed depends on each state's law. See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
But see, e.g., Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970). On the other hand, the federal
government is completely immune from an award of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970). The existence
of governmental immunity in this area is unfortunate since it deprives the public interest plaintiff
of a source of fees and, in turn, decreases the incentive for governmental agencies to enforce the
laws. See generally Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Miller 344-47.
